5 friends want to divide 100 candies among them, they all are very intelligent,treacherous and selfish.
Let's number them 1 to 5 and consider the lowest number to be the leader.
Leader proposes a distribution of the candies. All other friends vote on the proposal, and if half of them say “Yes”, the candies are divided as proposed, as no friend would be willing to take on the leader without superior force on their side.
If the leader fails to obtain support of at least half his friends(which includes himself), he faces a mutiny, and all friends make him leave. The leader start over again with the next lowest number as leader.
What is the maximum number of candies the leader(number 1) can achieve if they all choose optimally.
Answers
Question: Five pirates discover a chest containing 100 gold coins. They decide to sit down and devise a distribution strategy. The pirates are ranked based on their experience (Pirate 1 to Pirate 5, where Pirate 5 is the most experienced). The most experienced pirate gets to propose a plan and then all the pirates vote on it. If at least half of the pirates agree on the plan, the gold is split according to the proposal. If not, the most experienced pirate is thrown off the ship and this process continues with the remaining pirates until a proposal is accepted. The first priority of the pirates is to stay alive and second to maximize the gold they get. Pirate 5 devises a plan which he knows will be accepted for sure and will maximize his gold. What is his plan?
Answer:
This proposal will get accepted and provide the maximum amount of gold to pirate 5.
Step-by-step explanation:
To understand the answer, we need to reduce this problem to only 2 pirates. So what happens if there are only 2 pirates. Pirate 2 can easily propose that he gets all the 100 gold coins. Since he constitutes 50% of the pirates, the proposal has to be accepted leaving Pirate 1 with nothing.
Now let’s look at 3 pirates situation, Pirate 3 knows that if his proposal does not get accepted, then pirate 2 will get all the gold and pirate 1 will get nothing. So he decides to bribe pirate 1 with one gold coin. Pirate 1 knows that one gold coin is better than nothing so he has to back pirate 3. Pirate 3 proposes {pirate 1, pirate 2, pirate 3} {1, 0, 99}. Since pirate 1 and 3 will vote for it, it will be accepted.
If there are 4 pirates, pirate 4 needs to get one more pirate to vote for his proposal. Pirate 4 realizes that if he dies, pirate 2 will get nothing (according to the proposal with 3 pirates) so he can easily bribe pirate 2 with one gold coin to get his vote. So the distribution will be {0, 1, 0, 99}.
Smart right? Now can you figure out the distribution with 5 pirates? Let’s see. Pirate 5 needs 2 votes and he knows that if he dies, pirate 1 and 3 will get nothing. He can easily bribe pirates 1 and 3 with one gold coin each to get their vote. In the end, he proposes {1, 0, 1, 0, 98}. This proposal will get accepted and provide the maximum amount of gold to pirate 5.