An activity passes the "Lemon Test” if it is not secular, biased, or entangled. secular, biased, and free of entanglement. secular, neutral, and free of entanglement. not secular, neutral, or free of entanglement.
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Answered by
3
The establishment clause severs the link between church
and state, but it does not disassociate religion from govern-
ment. Therein lies the seed of a problem, for in practice it has
proven difficult to accomplish the desired separation of church
and state without adversely affecting the manner in which reli-
gion is permitted to shape democratic government. Because
the state has no competence in religious matters, government
is prohibited from sanctioning any particular religion by codify-
ing its confession of faith into civil law. On the other hand,
when strict separationists, asserting the establishment clause,
seek to protect the acts of state from "contamination" by reli-
gion, it discourages citizens from using their religious faith as
the basis for political action and speech. At the level of individ-
uals, this drives a wedge between the religionist's life as a citi-
zen and his identity as a believer. On the level of political
community, this leads to moral indirection and thus a less sta-
ble society.'
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. See Mittleman, Toward a Postseparationist Public Philosophy: A Jewish
Contribution, 24 THIs WORLD 87, 98-99 (1989):
As a defensive strategy, [strict] separationism neglects the task of
recovering a free and democratic public life, sustained by the
practical reasoning, public virtue, and dedication to the common
good of the moral and spiritual communities. Although it guards
the public square against domination by one or another set of
symbols, it leaves the public square without symbol, bereft of moral
principle and order other than that provided by the inherent
structures of bureaucracy and technological pursuit.
It forbids precisely those sources of meaning and value which
inform the lives of moral and spiritual communities from entering
into the realm which most requires guidance and direction. It lays
both religion and the religious communities onto a Procrustean bed,
for it construes religion as a kind of moralistic, privatistic intruder.
Rather than grasp religion as a source of communal action, freedom
and vision, it imagines religion as a bald set of do's and don'ts, alien
in kind to a pluralistic public life. Religion's ability to shape a broad
program of service is overlooked. Furthermore, the religious
communities themselves are reduced to social problems vis-A-vis the
general order. Whenever they seek to involve themselves in the
513
HeinOnline -- 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 513 1989-1990
and state, but it does not disassociate religion from govern-
ment. Therein lies the seed of a problem, for in practice it has
proven difficult to accomplish the desired separation of church
and state without adversely affecting the manner in which reli-
gion is permitted to shape democratic government. Because
the state has no competence in religious matters, government
is prohibited from sanctioning any particular religion by codify-
ing its confession of faith into civil law. On the other hand,
when strict separationists, asserting the establishment clause,
seek to protect the acts of state from "contamination" by reli-
gion, it discourages citizens from using their religious faith as
the basis for political action and speech. At the level of individ-
uals, this drives a wedge between the religionist's life as a citi-
zen and his identity as a believer. On the level of political
community, this leads to moral indirection and thus a less sta-
ble society.'
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. See Mittleman, Toward a Postseparationist Public Philosophy: A Jewish
Contribution, 24 THIs WORLD 87, 98-99 (1989):
As a defensive strategy, [strict] separationism neglects the task of
recovering a free and democratic public life, sustained by the
practical reasoning, public virtue, and dedication to the common
good of the moral and spiritual communities. Although it guards
the public square against domination by one or another set of
symbols, it leaves the public square without symbol, bereft of moral
principle and order other than that provided by the inherent
structures of bureaucracy and technological pursuit.
It forbids precisely those sources of meaning and value which
inform the lives of moral and spiritual communities from entering
into the realm which most requires guidance and direction. It lays
both religion and the religious communities onto a Procrustean bed,
for it construes religion as a kind of moralistic, privatistic intruder.
Rather than grasp religion as a source of communal action, freedom
and vision, it imagines religion as a bald set of do's and don'ts, alien
in kind to a pluralistic public life. Religion's ability to shape a broad
program of service is overlooked. Furthermore, the religious
communities themselves are reduced to social problems vis-A-vis the
general order. Whenever they seek to involve themselves in the
513
HeinOnline -- 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 513 1989-1990
Answered by
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The foundation condition disjoints the connection among chapel and state, yet it doesn't disassociate religion from government.
In that lies the seed of an issue, for by and by it has demonstrated hard to achieve the coveted partition of chapel and state without unfavorably influencing the way in which religion is allowed to shape law based government.
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