Causes for battle of wandiwash?
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Most historians credit the Battle of Plassey, fought on June 23, 1757, as the decisive event that brought about ultimate British rule over India. But was it really? A case can be made that the true turning point for control of the subcontinent was the victory of British forces under Eyre Coote over a French force led by Comte Thomas Arthur de Lally at Wandiwash on January 22, 1760.
Robert Clive, the victor at Plassey, amazingly had only 900 European troops and 2,100 native sepoys with him to engage about 50,000 natives, including 15,000 horsemen. He managed to rout this horde, but bribery and treachery played a role in the outcome. At Wandiwash, on the other hand, it was a stand-up fight between two tiny European armies, each led by a brave and capable general–a pair of Irishmen at that.
India, the destination of both Lally and Coote, was a country in political chaos, with assorted rajahs and nabobs fighting and plotting against each other. The French and English traders arriving in the 1600s had gained power and influence by taking sides in local wars in exchange for trade concessions and territory. By the 1740s, the French Compagnie des Indies Orientales and the British East India Company each ruled several towns along the coast of eastern India and had their own small armies made up of European troops and native soldiers called sepoys. Their discipline and superior weapons were more than a match for the untrained hordes of the Indian rulers.
When the War of the Austrian Succession erupted in Europe, both France and England sent units of their armies to assist the company troops in India. During the fighting that followed, the French gained the advantage, but the peace terms returned to England most of the territory it had lost, including a large base at Madras. At that time, the strength of both European powers was still so weak that a powerful rajah could impose neutrality in his area upon both French and British.
Although there was peace in Europe, an undeclared war raged on in Bengal and along the subcontinent's Coromandel Coast, where local chiefs acted as proxies for their European allies. In this political snakepit, palace revolutions and assassinations won temporary alliance, but treachery was endemic, and the loyalty of native rajahs was ensured only by gold or the presence of European garrisons. With so vast a territory to loot and with government supervision half a world away, the temptation to extort tribute from the native rulers and make fortunes from illegal acts was simply too great for most officers of the trading companies.
From the top down to the lowliest clerks, graft was a way of life. If one did not die from the climate or disease, one had a good chance of returning home with a fortune. More often than not, the national policy of London or Versailles was ignored as company officials lined their own pockets. Such was the environment in which Lally was to fight a small war.
His troubles began even before he and his men left France. Some of his men had been diverted to Canada, and his war chest was slashed from 6 million livres to 4 million. His greatest cross, however, became the man picked to command the expeditionary fleet, Comte d'Aché. While personally brave, d'Aché was one of the most inept naval commanders ever to serve in the French navy.
On the day of departure, February 2, 1757, one ship was damaged leaving port, and the admiral returned the whole fleet to harbor, where it then became trapped by contrary winds until May 2. Once at sea, the ships maintained a leisurely pace more suited to a pleasure cruise than a military convoy. Precious weeks then were wasted in Rio de Janiero selling off the cargo of a captured prize ship. In his memoirs, Lally said that d'Aché would pull in sail at the slightest threat of a storm, or change course if a single sail had been sighted. It was April 28, 1758, before the fleet finally reached the French base at Pondicherry.
Robert Clive, the victor at Plassey, amazingly had only 900 European troops and 2,100 native sepoys with him to engage about 50,000 natives, including 15,000 horsemen. He managed to rout this horde, but bribery and treachery played a role in the outcome. At Wandiwash, on the other hand, it was a stand-up fight between two tiny European armies, each led by a brave and capable general–a pair of Irishmen at that.
India, the destination of both Lally and Coote, was a country in political chaos, with assorted rajahs and nabobs fighting and plotting against each other. The French and English traders arriving in the 1600s had gained power and influence by taking sides in local wars in exchange for trade concessions and territory. By the 1740s, the French Compagnie des Indies Orientales and the British East India Company each ruled several towns along the coast of eastern India and had their own small armies made up of European troops and native soldiers called sepoys. Their discipline and superior weapons were more than a match for the untrained hordes of the Indian rulers.
When the War of the Austrian Succession erupted in Europe, both France and England sent units of their armies to assist the company troops in India. During the fighting that followed, the French gained the advantage, but the peace terms returned to England most of the territory it had lost, including a large base at Madras. At that time, the strength of both European powers was still so weak that a powerful rajah could impose neutrality in his area upon both French and British.
Although there was peace in Europe, an undeclared war raged on in Bengal and along the subcontinent's Coromandel Coast, where local chiefs acted as proxies for their European allies. In this political snakepit, palace revolutions and assassinations won temporary alliance, but treachery was endemic, and the loyalty of native rajahs was ensured only by gold or the presence of European garrisons. With so vast a territory to loot and with government supervision half a world away, the temptation to extort tribute from the native rulers and make fortunes from illegal acts was simply too great for most officers of the trading companies.
From the top down to the lowliest clerks, graft was a way of life. If one did not die from the climate or disease, one had a good chance of returning home with a fortune. More often than not, the national policy of London or Versailles was ignored as company officials lined their own pockets. Such was the environment in which Lally was to fight a small war.
His troubles began even before he and his men left France. Some of his men had been diverted to Canada, and his war chest was slashed from 6 million livres to 4 million. His greatest cross, however, became the man picked to command the expeditionary fleet, Comte d'Aché. While personally brave, d'Aché was one of the most inept naval commanders ever to serve in the French navy.
On the day of departure, February 2, 1757, one ship was damaged leaving port, and the admiral returned the whole fleet to harbor, where it then became trapped by contrary winds until May 2. Once at sea, the ships maintained a leisurely pace more suited to a pleasure cruise than a military convoy. Precious weeks then were wasted in Rio de Janiero selling off the cargo of a captured prize ship. In his memoirs, Lally said that d'Aché would pull in sail at the slightest threat of a storm, or change course if a single sail had been sighted. It was April 28, 1758, before the fleet finally reached the French base at Pondicherry.
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