CHART 1: FOSTERING CULTURAL DIVERSITY STRENGTHENS FAITH IN THE INDIAN STATE Trust, support and identification: poor and diverse countries can do well with multicultural policies Support for democracy Trust in institutions National identification Democracy is preferable to any other Great deal, quite (%) How proud are you to be a national of... form of government (%) 1996-98 1995-978 Great deal, quite (%) 1995-978 1001 Percent United States Canada Australia Spain SA Austria India 2 Argentina Uruguay India Г - Spain 80 -Belgium Brazil Switzerland India Germany Chile - Canada s - Switzerland Austria Brazil Korea, Rep. of Brazil - 40 Germany - г Spain - Belgiumb United States 12 7 Australia 30 20 Argentina Note: Percentages exclude 'don't know/no answer' replies. a. The most recent year available during the period specified. b. Data refer to 1992. The most recent year during the period 1990-93.
Can someone explain this?
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Answer:
Which of the following information we does not construct a triangle?* 1️⃣ The length of all three sides would have been given. 2️⃣ Two sides and angle include between them have been given 3️⃣ Measures of all three angles given 4️⃣ Two angles and side include between them have been give
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In the postwar period, projects of social justice have often drawn upon ideas of national solidarity, calling upon shared national identities to mobilize support for the welfare state. Several commentators have argued that increasing immigration and multiculturalism policies often gives rise to, weaken this sense of national solidarity. This creates a potential “progressive’s dilemma”, forcing a choice between solidarity and diversity. My aim in this paper is two-fold: first, to argue for the importance of national solidarity as a progressive political resource; and second, to discuss how it can be reconciled with support for immigration and multiculturalism. I will try to identify the prospects for multicultural national solidarity – a multicultural welfare state, if you will – and to contrast it with the two obvious alternatives: neoliberal multiculturalism that champions mobility and diversity at the expense of national solidarity; and a welfare chauvinism that champions national solidarity at the expense of immigrants and minorities. For almost twenty years, the left has debated what is sometimes called the new progressive’s dilemma: the fear that there is a trade-off between being pro-immigrant and being a pro-welfare state. Large-scale immigration, and the ethnocultural diversity it brings with it, may make it more difficult to build or sustain the feelings of shared belonging and solidarity needed to maintain a robust welfare state. Extending justice to newcomers may weaken justice for the less-well-off members of the native-born working class. Attempts to empirically measure the existence of such a trade-off have produced mixed and inconclusive results, Footnote1 and many commentators dismiss the idea that there is an inherent or inexorable universal tendency for ethnic or religious heterogeneity to reduce solidarity. After all, the very categories of “immigrant”, “foreigner” and “ethnic diversity” are not brute facts, but are socially constructed. This is reflected in the many different ways that researchers define the “others” who are said to challenge existing bonds of nationhood: some researchers only look at those immigrants who have not naturalized, others include anyone who was foreign-born regardless of their legal status; some look only at the first generation foreign-born population, others assume that the native-born second generation also counts; some researchers include immigrants from all foreign countries, others only count people from outside the EU, on the assumption that fellow Europeans are not really “others”; and so on. To test whether ethnocultural diversity erodes a feeling of national belonging, should a child of Irish immigrants who are born in London be counted amongst the national “we” that is being challenged by immigration, or amongst the immigrant “they” who pose the challenge? Any answer to the question seems arbitrary at best, and meaningless at worst. Once we recognize the contingency of perceptions of commonality and otherness, it might seem that the very idea of a progressive’s dilemma relating to immigration is unhelpful or misguided. There is no reason to assume in advance that immigrants form a “they”, or indeed that the native-born form a “we”: the lines of identification are likely to be infinitely more complex and variable. To assume otherwise is to sin methodological nationalism: ie., to naturalize and reify the nation-state, to exaggerate its internal cohesion, and to assume that it defines the natural boundaries of politics, society, and culture. Much of the existing literature on the progressive’s dilemma does indeed suffer from this sort of methodological nationalism, and thereby implicitly and uncritically “mirrors and legitimizes nation-building projects” (Sager, 2014). Nonetheless, I think the progressive’s dilemma cannot be dismissed so easily, in part because nation-building projects – with their social constructions of a national `we’ and a foreign `they’ - are pervasive features of the contemporary world.