Contemporary issuse on chain snaching
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The dominant features of Chinese politics in this decade have been the rise of Xi Jinping, the return of repressive autocracy, and an inconclusive effort to re-engineer China’s economic model. China’s middle class has expanded enormously but the Chinese Communist Party has yet to find a political model that can accommodate this new, educated urban majority’s aspirations for greater participation in government decision-making. The major trends in China’s national security situation over this period have been a more ambitious role for China in global governance, worsening relations with most neighbors, strengthening ties with Russia, and escalating rivalry with the United States. China now finds itself less confident internally and in a markedly less peaceful international environment than before.
Foreign views of China have shifted too, and not in ways favorable to Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party has lost its previous reputation for superhuman competence in managing economic affairs. China’s political system has become even less attractive than before, with significant implications for its eventual integration of outlying parts of the Chinese commonwealth, like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some now worry that China may suffer economic collapse and political turmoil that could destabilize all of Eurasia. Many more fear that China will use its growing economic and military power to force its neighbors to defer to it.
In short, after a quarter-century in which its domestic and foreign affairs trajectories seemed relatively predictable and unchallenging to Chinese and foreigners alike, China is back to a future of multiplying uncertainties and potential crises. The reconciliation of Taiwan with the China mainland is once again in doubt. The danger of cross-Strait conflict is no longer receding. Reef-top posturing and naval games of “chicken” in the East and South China Seas nurture possibilities of armed conflict between China and Japan and the United States.
Foreign views of China have shifted too, and not in ways favorable to Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party has lost its previous reputation for superhuman competence in managing economic affairs. China’s political system has become even less attractive than before, with significant implications for its eventual integration of outlying parts of the Chinese commonwealth, like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some now worry that China may suffer economic collapse and political turmoil that could destabilize all of Eurasia. Many more fear that China will use its growing economic and military power to force its neighbors to defer to it.
In short, after a quarter-century in which its domestic and foreign affairs trajectories seemed relatively predictable and unchallenging to Chinese and foreigners alike, China is back to a future of multiplying uncertainties and potential crises. The reconciliation of Taiwan with the China mainland is once again in doubt. The danger of cross-Strait conflict is no longer receding. Reef-top posturing and naval games of “chicken” in the East and South China Seas nurture possibilities of armed conflict between China and Japan and the United States.
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