discuss the economic development of northern mountains of pakistan
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Answer:
1 Biddulph, J., Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh, Calcutta, 1880, p. 1.Google Scholar
2 The region is little known to the outside world, although valuable descriptive and historical accounts were published by travellers and political officers during the nineteenth century. A few excellent studies have also been published during the twentieth century, mostly concerned with the linguistics, ethnology, or glaciology of particular groups or localities. Quantitative data are few and fragmentary, both for the past and the present: even though certain official data are now collected for all parts of the region (for example, during recent population censuses) many of these data are ‘classified’ and hence not available. This paper is largely based on material that the author collected in the region at various times between 1962 and 1966.
3 Some of these ‘caste’ distinctions represent the subjugation of an established population by an invading group; some are associated with the artisan groups and with the provision of specialized services; while others probably represent former stages in the conversion to Islam, when those members of the population who were already Muslim were prevented from giving women in marriage to those who remained non-Muslims. For examples, see Biddulph, 1880, p. 36; Lorimer, D. L. R., The Dumaki Language: Outlines of the Speech of the Doma, or Bericho, of Hunza, Nijmegen, 1939, p. 9;Google Scholar and Barth, Fredrik, Indus and Swat Kohistan: An Ethnographic Survey, Oslo, 1956, p. 42.Google Scholar
4 E.g., Drew, Frederic, The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories: A Geographical Account, London, 1875, pp. 456 ff.Google Scholar
5 Traditional peaceable procedures for settling disputes and attaining rank are described by Muhammad, Ghulam in ‘Festivals and Folklore of Gilgit’, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 1905–1907, I, 1907, p. 103.Google Scholar See also Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, I, ‘Tribes North of the Kabul River’, Simla, 1907, pp. 36–7.Google Scholar
6 Barth, , 1956, pp. 79 ff.Google Scholar
7 E.g., Barth, , 1956, pp. 79–86.Google Scholar
8 This has already been suggested byJettmar, Karl in ‘Ethnological Research in Dardistan 1958: Preliminary Report’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 105, 1, 1961, p. 85.Google Scholar
9 The Sunni predominance in the southern part of the main Chitral valley is the result of secondary missionary activity. Local differences in the codes of the three sects are directly reflected in the agriculture; for example, in the distribution of cannabis-cultivation in Chitral, and in the growing of fruit for wine elsewhere.
10 There was no rule of succession, and on the death of a mehtar his brothers and sons fought among themselves until all but one were killed or forced into exile. These periodic struggles seem to have been largely confined to the upper class and to the capital and did not necessarily result in disruption of the administration. On the accession of a new mehtar provincial and other officials were expected to transfer their allegiance, hence the proverb which has often been misunderstood by foreigners: ‘He who rules my country is my king.’ During the nineteenth century at least, the Katore mehtars effectively kept the peace within their own territory, and the relative security of life and property there was remarked upon by several of the early travellers.
11 One group particularly liable to enslavement was the Kalash, a conquered but non-Muslim people inhabiting parts of the southern Katore territory. In addition to the Katore, the Kushwaqt and the rulers of Gilgit (i.e. in those principalities where centralized rule was long-established) used to sell their own subjects into slavery. Their right to raise revenue in this manner was apparently explicit, and largely by this means they paid for the import of costly luxury goods that were used on formal occasions. Men, women and children were in fact a major exportable resource, with the advantage of being relatively easily moved over difficult terrain. See, inter alia, Moorcroft, William and Trebeck, George, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab: In Ladakh and Kashmir; in Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz and Bokhara; from 1819–1825 (ed. Horace, Hayman Wilson), II, London, 1841, p. 270;Google ScholarDurand, Algernon, The Making of a Frontier: Five Years' Experiences and Adventures in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chitral, and the Eastern Hindu-Kush, London, 1900, pp. 51–2;Google ScholarVans Agnew, P. A., ‘Diaries of Mr P. A. Vans Agnew, Assistant to the Agent, Governor-General, North-West Frontier, on deputation to Gilgit—1847’, The Political Diaries of the Resident at Lahore and his Assistants 1846–1849, VI, Lahore, 1915, p. 288.
Answer:
Gilgit-Baltistan represents something of an enigma in the area of development policy and practice for not only Pakistan, but also South and Central Asia. Despite its isolation and impoverishments, its regional literacy and primary, secondary, and even university education completion rates rival and often surpass those found in the wealthiest and most developed areas of Pakistan and are comparable to the highest rates in Asia. As a consequence of intensive development investments in the region since the 1970s by the government and the Ismaili Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) and its many subsidiaries, including the Aga Khan Education Services (AKES), the global development literature characterizes Gilgit-Baltistan as being symbolic of the successes of development, an exemplar of progress and modernity. However, such depictions are not without their challenges or debates, as the complex realities of educational development in the region confirm. By seeking out the factors that underpin, shape, and sometimes confound educational advancements, Benz’s monograph provides a timely empirical evaluation and much-needed critique of education as an experienced and enacted vehicle for development.
Benz employed diverse data collection strategies in his fieldwork to generate 3 empirical village case studies that reflected the realities of education in the region’s Ismaili, Shia, and Sunni Muslim communities. Using questionnaire survey and qualitative interview techniques, and by drawing on hitherto underexplored regional archival, scholarly, and reporting materials, his work was guided by 2 primary questions: what new opportunities are afforded by education and produce improved living conditions; and what are the risks and constraints that threaten the successful realization of education strategies and outcomes?
In answering, Benz investigated how household members in each village responded to educational opportunities and disentangled the complex reasons behind the educational disparities within households and according to gender, socioeconomic status, and sectarian affiliation. Through his comparative approach, he was well positioned to evaluate the distinctive ways in which each sectarian community subscribes to education as a means of modernization, capable of producing economic uplift for individuals, households, and communities alike. He found his participants drawn to education for ideological, pragmatic, and aspirational reasons and that education was positively associated with improved social status and advancement, increased employment, and more income opportunities. He also confirms how educational initiatives, such as those developed by AKES and preferred by Ismaili communities, have enhanced sectarian bonds of affiliation and collective well-being.
The Introduction summarizes the monograph’s overall objectives and establishes the broader history and context of Pakistan’s educational sector development, policy, and programming. In the earliest days of the nation, education—particularly scientific and technical studies—was conceived as a means to energize Pakistan’s development and thereby fulfill its growing socioeconomic, industrial, and technical needs. Yet despite Pakistan’s growing economic power, its national educational developments and indicators have lagged behind those of almost every other Asian country. Benz confirms that the past and ongoing crisis of public education expenditures have hinged on the government’s lack of political commitment, and its prioritization of other sectors—the military in particular. State disinvestments have led to rural educational indicators and literacy rates falling far behind urban rates, and male students continue to outnumber female students. For this reason, Gilgit-Baltistan and its educational achievements, especially in terms of high regional rates of female school enrollments, attendance, and literacy, stand as a paradoxical exception to the inconsistencies and failings found elsewhere in the country.
Chapter 1 provides a cogent summary of the roles played by modernization and dependency theories in shaping educational initiatives and discusses the economic propositions, human capital approaches, and education “optimistic” and “sceptic” theories that Benz applied to predict for, as well as assess, successful or “failed” educational outcomes. He then discusses the sociology of education and its use of functionalist and social reproduction theories, and reviews how these diverse theoretical perspectives shaped his research and necessitated a dialectical approach. Chapters 2 and 3 summarize the key concepts, frameworks, and methodologies that guided the study design and structured the fieldwork and data analysis.