Explain any five safeguard using which you can avoid
violation
Answers
Answer:
The 2001 unmasking of insider Robert Philip Hanssen as a Russian spy taught the FBI a harsh lesson that most organizations have yet to learn: There's great danger from those we trust the most.
We've gotten pretty good at protecting our perimeters, but most of us do a less-than-adequate job protecting our enterprises from employees (current and former), business partners, contractors, interns and even customers. While most of our attention is focused on internet-based attacks, insiders cause the vast majority of security incidents and can do the most damage. It makes sense: They have intimate knowledge of our network layouts, applications, staff and business practices.
Institutional laxity invites insider problems. In a revealing report, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General cited not Hanssen's brilliance as a spy, but rather the bureau's failure to implement and enforce strong insider security procedures as a prime reason for his success over 20 years.
The FBI isn't unique on this score. Insiders are typically subject to very few controls -- organizations tend to rely on trust rather than any sort of technical or procedural countermeasures. The result can be sabotaged systems, destroyed data, stolen credit card information, etc. The DOJ's list of computer intrusion cases is a litany of inside jobs. Consider just a few:
A worker in GTE's Network Service Support Center in Tampa, Fla., wiped data and caused more than $200,000 in damage.
A computer programmer for North Carolina-based Lance, angered over a demotion, planted a logic bomb that took field sales reps' computers offline for days.
A pair of Chase Manhattan Bank employees stole credit card numbers, which they used to steal nearly $100,000.
Explanation: