Explain with examples, lord denning's views on interpretation of wills.
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photosynthesis is the process by which green plants make their own food
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Explanation:
Richard Wilson looks at changes to the approach of the Court when construing wills.
The approach of the Court when construing wills has changed considerably over time, from being based on a rigid application of the strict literal meanings of the words used by the testator to one aimed at discerning the true intentions of the testator, even when the literal wording of the testamentary document appears not to reflect those intentions (see, for example, Blech v Blech [2002] WTLR 483 and Esson v Esson [2010] WTLR 187). The change in approach may, in part, be attributable to the intervention of Parliament in the form of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, which enables the Court to consider extrinsic evidence of the testator’s intention (s.21) and to rectify wills that do not reflect the testator’s intentions (s.20). These legislative tools mean that the Court is now far better placed to ascertain and give effect to testators’ intentions than was the case in the past. However, even before the passing of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, judicial attitudes had shifted away from a literal approach where the result of the application of such an approach would lead to what the Court considered to be the incorrect result. In a dissenting judgment in the case of Re Allsop [1968] Ch 39 at p.47, Lord Denning stated the following:
‘The object of the court in construing a will is to discover the intention of the testator. I do not think his intention is to be discovered by looking at the literal meaning of the words alone. That has led, times out of number, to the frustration of his intentions. You must look at the will in the light of surrounding circumstances. Eschewing technical rules and literal interpretation, you must look to see simply what the testator intended. If you find that a literal interpretation gives rise to a capricious result which you are satisfied the testator can never have intended, then you should reject that interpretation and seek for a sensible interpretation which does accord with his intention. It is sometimes said that a testator can be as capricious as he likes. Yes, if you are sure he intended to be. But you should not impute capriciousness to him merely to justify yourself in giving the words a literal interpretation.’
The decision of Mr Kevin Prosser QC in the Esson case is a good example of the application of the approach advocated by Lord Denning in Re Allsop. In Esson, the deceased left a home-made codicil which stated the following:
‘My Portman Building Society Account No. 72013068 is the residue of monies left to me by my mother Mrs Edith Firman. My husband Norman John Clements is in full agreement that should I predecease him, all monies in this account should be divided equally between my grandchildren.’
The deceased did not predecease her husband, and therefore the question arose as to whether the gift contained in the codicil failed (on the basis that the gift was conditional the deceased predeceasing her husband) or should be given effect to (on the basis that the deceased’s intention was to benefit the grandchildren in any event). The deputy judge held that notwithstanding the literal meaning of the words used by the deceased, viewed in context it was clear that the deceased did not intend to make the gift conditional on her predeceasing her husband. Echoing the comments of Lord Denning in Re Allsop, he stated:
‘...it would be even more surprising if [the Deceased] intended to make the gift to her grandchildren conditional upon the occurrence of a chance event, namely her happening to predecease her husband. Of course [the Deceased] was entitled to be capricious, but it is improbable that that was her true intention.’
In Esson, the deputy judge considered that the wording of the codicil was sufficiently ambiguous to enable him to consider extrinsic evidence of the deceased’s testamentary intentions, in accordance with s.21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. However, the deputy judge makes it clear in the judgment that he considered it possible to come to the same conclusion without reliance on extrinsic evidence.