how are Britain France and Russia responsible for World War II.give reason
Answers
Explanation:
East Stratcom was established in 2015 to “address Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns”, through (i) more effective communication and promotion of policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, (ii) a strengthened media environment in the region, and (iii) an improved capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation. Since then the EU itself has faced many of the same communications challenges as its Eastern Neighbourhood: Member States can also be surprised and caught off guard by the disinformation methods used, and increasingly contact East Stratcom for advice and best practice.
This article seeks to set out a detailed assessment of the nature of the challenge It is based on two and half years of daily observation of various parts of Russia’s disinformation and on the recommendations of a wide range of experts in this field.
The nature of the challenge
The pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign has one underlying strategy. Despite the diversity of messages, channels, tools, levels, ambitions and tactical aims, and notwithstanding its rapidly adapting nature, the strategic objective is one and the same – to weaken the West and strengthen the Kremlin in a classic zero-sum game approach. While it is important to be aware of this overarching strategic objective, we also need to understand how this objective is translated at the tactical level.
Disinformation has different messages for different audiences. There are different messages for Russians and for non-Russians; and for non-Russians in different parts of the world. The disinformation message that the EU turns people into homosexuals or paedophiles would be considered ridiculous in Western Europe, but can persuade some audiences in the Eastern Partnership countries. On the other hand, these audiences would probably find implausible the message that Ukraine is led by politicians with fascist beliefs – something which, on the contrary, could succeed with some audiences in some Western European countries.
The disinformation campaign has an unknown number of channels and speakers, some of which are operating in a non-public environment, like closed events, direct messaging platforms and through people-to-people contacts. The scale encompasses the highest public authorities, diplomatic networks and security services; NGOs, GONGOs; official, “white” Russian media, unofficial, “grey” pro-Kremlin outlets and disinformation-oriented projects financed by pro-Kremlin oligarchs; local extremists and conspiracy theorists; social media trolls and bots; and individuals who simply get persuaded or attracted into the disinformation ecosystem. It adds up, every day, to a plethora of channels spreading a plethora of multilingual disinformation messages, and seeking to win new hearts and minds to continue the job. The sheer volume of disinformation and the constant repetition is key to the campaign’s success in creating a plethora of seemingly independent sources repeating the same message.
The campaign has different tactical aims and objectives for different audiences. It can present conspiracy theories to the audience that is ready to consume such conspiracies. It will play on pro-Russian and anti-Western feelings in one society, and exploit local national minority issues or anti-German/pan-Slavic emotions in another. It will fuel hysteria and polarisation through aggressively anti-refugee messaging or pro-refugee messaging (ditto anti-LGBT and pro-LGBT, or other divisive questions), to persuade both sides that those on the other side are an existential threat. It will try to find those issues in our societies that garner most emotions around them, and it will try to fuel and amplify these emotions as far as possible – because an audience shaken by strong emotions will behave more irrationally and will be easier to manipulate. Fear is by far the most abused emotion, as it is fear that manages to polarize societies the most. On an individual level, the actors of the disinformation campaign will try to intimidate individuals more prone to personal attacks. It also seeks to confuse mainstream media who try to balance between conflicting versions of events, turning this virtue of our media against us. It will overload those who try to find more sources of information, and denigrate those who call out these tricks.
The disinformation campaign has different perspectives. It can try to exploit existing divisions, or create new, artificial ones: on the more strategic level, like between the EU and NATO or the EU and the US; or at a national level, like between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, or two countries with historical issues. It will try to exploit, amplify or invent divisions within one society, between various socioeconomic groups, between various political parties, within one government or within one region. Again, any tool that weakens the West (be it on an international or an intra-national level) works.
Answer:
East Stratcom was established in 2015 to “address Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns”, through (i) more effective communication and promotion of policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, (ii) a strengthened media environment in the region, and (iii) an improved capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation. Since then the EU itself has faced many of the same communications challenges as its Eastern Neighbourhood: Member States can also be surprised and caught off guard by the disinformation methods used, and increasingly contact East Stratcom for advice and best practice.
This article seeks to set out a detailed assessment of the nature of the challenge It is based on two and half years of daily observation of various parts of Russia’s disinformation and on the recommendations of a wide range of experts in this field.
The nature of the challenge
The pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign has one underlying strategy. Despite the diversity of messages, channels, tools, levels, ambitions and tactical aims, and notwithstanding its rapidly adapting nature, the strategic objective is one and the same – to weaken the West and strengthen the Kremlin in a classic zero-sum game approach. While it is important to be aware of this overarching strategic objective, we also need to understand how this objective is translated at the tactical level.
Disinformation has different messages for different audiences. There are different messages for Russians and for non-Russians; and for non-Russians in different parts of the world. The disinformation message that the EU turns people into homosexuals or paedophiles would be considered ridiculous in Western Europe, but can persuade some audiences in the Eastern Partnership countries. On the other hand, these audiences would probably find implausible the message that Ukraine is led by politicians with fascist beliefs – something which, on the contrary, could succeed with some audiences in some Western European countries.
The disinformation campaign has an unknown number of channels and speakers, some of which are operating in a non-public environment, like closed events, direct messaging platforms and through people-to-people contacts. The scale encompasses the highest public authorities, diplomatic networks and security services; NGOs, GONGOs; official, “white” Russian media, unofficial, “grey” pro-Kremlin outlets and disinformation-oriented projects financed by pro-Kremlin oligarchs; local extremists and conspiracy theorists; social media trolls and bots; and individuals who simply get persuaded or attracted into the disinformation ecosystem. It adds up, every day, to a plethora of channels spreading a plethora of multilingual disinformation messages, and seeking to win new hearts and minds to continue the job. The sheer volume of disinformation and the constant repetition is key to the campaign’s success in creating a plethora of seemingly independent sources repeating the same message.
The campaign has different tactical aims and objectives for different audiences. It can present conspiracy theories to the audience that is ready to consume such conspiracies. It will play on pro-Russian and anti-Western feelings in one society, and exploit local national minority issues or anti-German/pan-Slavic emotions in another. It will fuel hysteria and polarisation through aggressively anti-refugee messaging or pro-refugee messaging (ditto anti-LGBT and pro-LGBT, or other divisive questions), to persuade both sides that those on the other side are an existential threat. It will try to find those issues in our societies that garner most emotions around them, and it will try to fuel and amplify these emotions as far as possible – because an audience shaken by strong emotions will behave more irrationally and will be easier to manipulate. Fear is by far the most abused emotion, as it is fear that manages to polarize societies the most. On an individual level, the actors of the disinformation campaign will try to intimidate individuals more prone to personal attacks. It also seeks to confuse mainstream media who try to balance between conflicting versions of events, turning this virtue of our media against us. It will overload those who try to find more sources of information, and denigrate those who call out these tricks.
The disinformation campaign has different perspectives. It can try to exploit existing divisions, or create new, artificial ones: on the more strategic level, like between the EU and NATO or the EU and the US; or at a national level, like between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, or two countries with historical issues. It will try to exploit, amplify or invent divisions within one society, between various socioeconomic groups, between various political parties, within one government or within one region. Again, any tool that weakens the West (be it on an international or an intra-national level) works.