Question

How can we avert the economic issues of crisis in the post cold war? ​

Answer 1

Answer:

The sanctions literature is among the most contentious and inconclusive in international relations. Survey the studies of major sanctions cases—from pre-Cold War ones like the 1935–1936 League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini’s Italy, to Cold War-era ones like the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, the 1960s–1970s United Nations (UN) sanctions against Rhodesia, the 1981–1983 Siberian gas pipeline and the 1980s antiapartheid sanctions, and post-Cold War cases like Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, Libya, and Iran—and one finds some studies that claim success while others of the very same cases conclude that the sanctions were failures.

The basic theoretical debate is often cast as traditionalists versus revisionists. Traditionalists see little efficacy in sanctions. “It would be difficult to find any proposition in the international relations literature more widely accepted,” as David Baldwin puts it in his critique of the traditionalists, “than those belittling the utility of economic techniques of statecraft.” Among the works Baldwin cites are studies by Henry Bienen and Robert Gilpin, who accept “the nearly unanimous conclusion of scholars that sanctions seldom achieve their purposes and more likely have severe counterproductive consequences”; Charles Kindleberger, that “most sanctions are not effective”; Klaus Knorr, on their “uncertain effectiveness and decidedly low utility when used for purposes of coercing other states”; Margaret Doxey, that “in none of the cases analyzed in this study have economic sanctions succeeded in producing the desired political result”; Johan Galtung, that “the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative”; and Donald Losman, that the cases he studied “failed to accomplish their political ends, and it seems unlikely that economic

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