How does vote bank and caste affest election
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The coverage of the Bihar elections abounds with considerations on caste, defined as the go-to variable to understand both alliance's strategies and voters' alignments. Indeed, both main alliances devised mutually exclusive social and political alliances, and, contrary to recent electoral campaigns in other states, spare no efforts publicising the promises they make to specific groups.
The focus on caste however tends to ignore the deep transformation that caste politics has undergone in Northern India in recent years.
The first trend that one sees is that traditional vote bank support towards the so-called caste based parties they are associated with is gradually eroding. In recent years, in Bihar, more Yadavs vote for non-RJD candidates than in the past. The earlier alignments between certain types of castes and certain parties fielding candidates from the same background have given way to a far more diversified and localized electoral strategy, consisting in building local alliances between groups according to their local demographic and political power balance. The political instability of the 1990s stemmed largely from the fact that parties focused on narrow social bases, therefore limiting their capacity to score large victories, let alone obtain single majorities of seats. But as parties grew more "inclusive" — out of necessity — the support among their core group eroded.
As political parties see it
The second misconception that one sees frequently is the idea that caste operates on its own, irrespective of other dimensions. From the parties' point of view, identifying which caste they should ally with locally, and distributing the tickets accordingly, is only the beginning of the process. One has to identify the right candidate within the targeted groups. In that regard, caste is only one aspect of a candidate's "winnability". The capacity to garner support across caste barriers, the resources they can mobilise, their connections to local power wielders and business interests, and the local history of inter caste relations are all aspects that are taken into account while selecting candidates. The necessity to place kins and relatives, and the fact that parties attempt at the same time to anticipate their rivals' strategies make the distribution of tickets even more complex.
These variables — identity, resources, connection to elite groups, local history and lineage — form what one could term as the rules of political engagement, or a set of constraints that weigh on both parties, candidates and ultimately voters.
Candidates' perspective
If one looks at the election from the candidates' perspective, the outlook is grim. Elections in India are very competitive but in more diverse ways than it seem at first sight. As a candidate, one has to compete not only with other parties' candidates, but also within their own party and often within their own social group or community, in order to get the ticket in the first place. Such as it is, the campaign for the ticket is often longer, harder and at times more expensive and violent than the electoral campaign itself. It takes years for an aspiring politician to build a profile that will retain a party's attention.
Costs & career
At the same time, campaign costs are ever increasing. Not only one needs to spend resources to get into the fray, but one also needs to outspend their competitors. And once they're elected (if they are), they enter into a world of daily expenditures, where every interaction with constituents necessitates the spending of resources of some kind or another. Being a candidate and an elected representative is a hugely expensive proposition.
To make things worse, data shows that the political life expectancy of MLAs is very short. On average, more than half of the incumbent MLAs of any Vidhan Sabha in Northern India do not get a second term.
One wonders then what is the rationality of competing when getting a ticket is hard, winning uncertain, the whole enterprise costly no matter what happens and if in addition, a candidate is nearly certain to be kicked out after one term, either by voters or more likely so by his or her own party, as a casualty of anti-incumbency prevention, faction wars or due to pre-electoral seat sharing agreements. There must be incentives to do so, reasons to think that one will be able to recover one's investment, and eventually make a surplus.
The focus on caste however tends to ignore the deep transformation that caste politics has undergone in Northern India in recent years.
The first trend that one sees is that traditional vote bank support towards the so-called caste based parties they are associated with is gradually eroding. In recent years, in Bihar, more Yadavs vote for non-RJD candidates than in the past. The earlier alignments between certain types of castes and certain parties fielding candidates from the same background have given way to a far more diversified and localized electoral strategy, consisting in building local alliances between groups according to their local demographic and political power balance. The political instability of the 1990s stemmed largely from the fact that parties focused on narrow social bases, therefore limiting their capacity to score large victories, let alone obtain single majorities of seats. But as parties grew more "inclusive" — out of necessity — the support among their core group eroded.
As political parties see it
The second misconception that one sees frequently is the idea that caste operates on its own, irrespective of other dimensions. From the parties' point of view, identifying which caste they should ally with locally, and distributing the tickets accordingly, is only the beginning of the process. One has to identify the right candidate within the targeted groups. In that regard, caste is only one aspect of a candidate's "winnability". The capacity to garner support across caste barriers, the resources they can mobilise, their connections to local power wielders and business interests, and the local history of inter caste relations are all aspects that are taken into account while selecting candidates. The necessity to place kins and relatives, and the fact that parties attempt at the same time to anticipate their rivals' strategies make the distribution of tickets even more complex.
These variables — identity, resources, connection to elite groups, local history and lineage — form what one could term as the rules of political engagement, or a set of constraints that weigh on both parties, candidates and ultimately voters.
Candidates' perspective
If one looks at the election from the candidates' perspective, the outlook is grim. Elections in India are very competitive but in more diverse ways than it seem at first sight. As a candidate, one has to compete not only with other parties' candidates, but also within their own party and often within their own social group or community, in order to get the ticket in the first place. Such as it is, the campaign for the ticket is often longer, harder and at times more expensive and violent than the electoral campaign itself. It takes years for an aspiring politician to build a profile that will retain a party's attention.
Costs & career
At the same time, campaign costs are ever increasing. Not only one needs to spend resources to get into the fray, but one also needs to outspend their competitors. And once they're elected (if they are), they enter into a world of daily expenditures, where every interaction with constituents necessitates the spending of resources of some kind or another. Being a candidate and an elected representative is a hugely expensive proposition.
To make things worse, data shows that the political life expectancy of MLAs is very short. On average, more than half of the incumbent MLAs of any Vidhan Sabha in Northern India do not get a second term.
One wonders then what is the rationality of competing when getting a ticket is hard, winning uncertain, the whole enterprise costly no matter what happens and if in addition, a candidate is nearly certain to be kicked out after one term, either by voters or more likely so by his or her own party, as a casualty of anti-incumbency prevention, faction wars or due to pre-electoral seat sharing agreements. There must be incentives to do so, reasons to think that one will be able to recover one's investment, and eventually make a surplus.
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