industrial development does not depent on
Answers
Explanation:
Industrial development highlights the key economic tensions of capitalist societies. The inputs of technology and labor at the worksite have a quantifiable market value, but the conduct of manufacture itself depends only on their qualitative use values. Put another way, investors and economic planners follow the exchange values of the resources committed to manufacture and of the outputs distributed in the market, but commercial success depends on the separate moment of utilizing the concrete resources and employees at the worksite. Capitalist societies vary in how much their systems of finance and management focus on the need to upgrade technology at the worksite from only a short-term pecuniary perspective, and how much the technical drive to improve productivity steers investment in its own right. National economies that have experienced unusual industrial expansion, such as Germany's in the late nineteenth century, have sometimes pumped more funding into research and technology than prudent financial logic alone might have justified. In the classic case of the successful development of nineteenth-century German cotton textiles, for instance, investment surged at moments when earnings were ebbing and uncertain, but when the interest in upgrading equipment and the use of labor was keen. The example of Japan's slow growth in the last decade of the twentieth century suggests that in some settings, however, it is possible to overspend on research or on capital-intensive technology.
When producers invest in new industrial methods, they call upon their cultural conceptions of the capitalist economy to navigate the uncertain waters. In particular, their orientation to profit intertwines with popular conceptions of labor as an abstract, quantifiable resource in the workplace. Nineteenth-century manufacturers in the UK comprise a classic example of employers who believed the quantifiable increments of labor they appropriated from workers were delivered as if embodied in the workers' produce. British manufacturers accordingly viewed profit as the gain that resulted from buying labor products and other tangible articles at low prices and from reselling them higher. In the British cotton trade, for instance, manufacturers focused on cornering cheap raw materials, even if inferior grade inputs retarded improvements in labor productivity. Given their focus on profit from the sphere of exchange, British manufacturers purchased innovative equipment in the nineteenth century if they could foresee relatively immediate payoffs in trading in the current environment. Their contemporaries in Germany imagined that employers appropriated labor in the form of Arbeitskraft, ‘labor power.’ German manufacturers accordingly viewed profit as the result of the efficient conversion of this labor capacity into an output at the point of production. Industrial employers in Germany invested more heavily in new technology and in reorganizing work than did their counterparts in similar economic settings in Britain.
Practices for upholding relations of trust among firms have offered advantages in industrial development even when they contradict short-term profit seeking. In Japan, for example, corporations in the late twentieth century purchased assembly parts from suppliers through long-term relations that carried diffuse mutual responsibilities. So long as a customary supplier strode to boost its performance, corporations bought its components even when the price or quality fell below that offered by an emerging competitor. Models of individually rational economic behavior would expect corporations to switch to the best or least expensive provider in short order. Yet the longer-term purchasing commitment may paradoxically foster technological improvements in industries as wholes by increasing confidence that products issuing from renewed investment find secure buyers. The habitual Japanese purchasing system created effective organization for industrial innovation by ensuring an appropriate time horizon for carrying out research and design, by putting incremental but not lethal pressure on suppliers to upgrade their results, and above all by generating diffuse obligations to uphold quality and service beyond the letter of a formal contract.
Economics
Forrest D. Wright, in Researching Developing Countries, 2016
Scope and Methodology
The UN’s Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) compiles statistics on industrial growth, business structure, and overall industrial performance for over 150 countries in their data portal. UNIDO collects this data from several sources. Data on national accounts is derived from the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the IMF; industrial statistics is derived from national statistical offices (except for OECD member countries, in which case the OECD provided data to UNIDO); and data on trade is derived from the UN’s COMTRADE database, which primarily coll
Answer:
Industrial growth created a new class of wealthy industrialists and bankers who helped finance their empires.