what is low probability thinking
Answers
Step-by-step explanation:
The way people respond to the chance that an unlikely event will occur depends on how the event is described. We propose that people attach more weight to unlikely events when they can easily generate or imagine examples in which the event has occurred or will occur than when they cannot. We tested this idea in two experiments with mock jurors using written murder scenarios. The results suggested that jurors attach more weight to the defendant's claim that an incriminating DNA match is merely coincidental when it is easy for them to imagine other individuals whose DNA would also match than when it is not easy for them to imagine such individuals. We manipulated the difficulty of imagining such examples by varying the description of the DNA-match statistic. Some of the variations that influenced the jurors were normatively irrelevant.
Step-by-step explanation:
The way people respond to the chance that an unlikely event will occur depends on how the event is described. We propose that people attach more weight to unlikely events when they can easily generate or imagine examples in which the event has occurred or will occur than when they cannot. We tested this idea in two experiments with mock jurors using written murder scenarios. The results suggested that jurors attach more weight to the defendant's claim that an incriminating DNA match is merely coincidental when it is easy for them to imagine other individuals whose DNA would also match than when it is not easy for them to imagine such individuals. We manipulated the difficulty of imagining such examples by varying the description of the DNA-match statistic. Some of the variations that influenced the jurors were normatively irrelevant.
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