What is the relationship between freewill and freedom?
Answers
Answered by
0
ANSWER
.......
1. FREEWILL IS THE ABILITY TO MAKE CHOICES PURELY.
2. FREEDOM IS IN CONSTANTLY
.......
1. FREEWILL IS THE ABILITY TO MAKE CHOICES PURELY.
2. FREEDOM IS IN CONSTANTLY
Answered by
1
HOLA there
....
Under adequate determinism, my decisions are a strict function of who I am at a given moment, and who I am is a strict function of prior and external causes — although there’s so much recursion (I affect myself more than anything else affects me) that it creates a huge spike of uniqueness, individuality, and a meaningful functional distinction between myself and prior / external things. Now, it may be that who I am is not a strict function of prior and external causes, but adequate determinism says, “Yeah, but it’s not your conscience willpower that’s making this relationship nonstrict; it would be something like quantum randomness over which you have no control.”
There are two rough definitions of free will.
One is compatibilistic free will — “compatible” with adequate determinism. This says that if my decisions are strict functions of who I am at a given moment, and if who I am is a strict function of prior and external causes, that’s okay. That’s not what I really care about when I think about oppression of my will, says CFW — rather, what I care about is when someone stops me from doing what I want to do, or coerces me into doing something I’d otherwise rather not do. It also accepts that there’s no “perfectly free will” — we’re affected by all sorts of things to various degrees, and it displeases us to various degrees.
CFW is similar to what we think of as freedom.
Libertarian free will, by contrast, insists that my decisions are not strict functions of who I am at a given moment and/or who I am at a given moment is not a strict function of prior and external causes and the confounder thereto is largely my own willpower. It doesn’t have a positive coherent definition, but is a shot at capturing powerful feelings we have: Thefeeling of ex nihilo thoughts and the intense vividness of counterfactual imagination. Even folks who understand that these feelings have sensible explanations under adequate determinism may still assert LFW, since it’s useful as a “freedom of the gaps” to support exclusive and deserts-driven views of accountability. This is woefully useful as a tool for arbitrary exploitation, neglect of institutional reform, and to support certain ill-founded religious doctrines.
....
Under adequate determinism, my decisions are a strict function of who I am at a given moment, and who I am is a strict function of prior and external causes — although there’s so much recursion (I affect myself more than anything else affects me) that it creates a huge spike of uniqueness, individuality, and a meaningful functional distinction between myself and prior / external things. Now, it may be that who I am is not a strict function of prior and external causes, but adequate determinism says, “Yeah, but it’s not your conscience willpower that’s making this relationship nonstrict; it would be something like quantum randomness over which you have no control.”
There are two rough definitions of free will.
One is compatibilistic free will — “compatible” with adequate determinism. This says that if my decisions are strict functions of who I am at a given moment, and if who I am is a strict function of prior and external causes, that’s okay. That’s not what I really care about when I think about oppression of my will, says CFW — rather, what I care about is when someone stops me from doing what I want to do, or coerces me into doing something I’d otherwise rather not do. It also accepts that there’s no “perfectly free will” — we’re affected by all sorts of things to various degrees, and it displeases us to various degrees.
CFW is similar to what we think of as freedom.
Libertarian free will, by contrast, insists that my decisions are not strict functions of who I am at a given moment and/or who I am at a given moment is not a strict function of prior and external causes and the confounder thereto is largely my own willpower. It doesn’t have a positive coherent definition, but is a shot at capturing powerful feelings we have: Thefeeling of ex nihilo thoughts and the intense vividness of counterfactual imagination. Even folks who understand that these feelings have sensible explanations under adequate determinism may still assert LFW, since it’s useful as a “freedom of the gaps” to support exclusive and deserts-driven views of accountability. This is woefully useful as a tool for arbitrary exploitation, neglect of institutional reform, and to support certain ill-founded religious doctrines.
Similar questions