What is the relationship of human to the biological environment. Please I want the good anwer to my question immediately now.
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It is generally assumed that human beings perceive and understand the
world through the senses, and that that epistemic connection with the world
occurs via the transmission of information from the world through those senses
into a mind. The converse perspective on this same assumption is that the
environment influences individuals, both microgenetically and developmentally,
via the information that is generated in that environment and transmitted into the
minds of those individuals. I wish to contest this standard view of the nature of
epistemic contact with the world, and, therefore, also contest the corresponding
standard view of how the environment influences behavior and development.
A quick sense that there might be something wrong with both sides of the
standard view can be derived from consideration of what is usually taken to be
a purely philosophical problem with purely philosophical consequences: the
problem of skepticism (Annas & Barnes, 1985; Burnyeat, 1983; Popkin, 1979;
Rescher, 1980; Stroud, 1984; Wittgenstein, 1969). Briefly stated, the problem of
skepticism arises from the question: How can we possibly know that our
representations of the world are correct? The only answer seems to involve
checking those representations against the world to see if they in fact match,
but, by assumption, the only epistemic contact we have with the world is via
those representations themselves - any such check, therefore, is circular and
provides no epistemic ground.
Skepticism is generally relegated to philosophy, and, although
philosophers periodically attempt to discredit the skeptical question, no one has
in fact succeeded in solving it. The consensus, however, is that there has to be
something wrong with the skeptic's position, since it is clear that we do in fact
have epistemic knowledge of the world. This presumed invalidation of the
question, and, therefore, of the problem, is presupposed with even greater force
in psychology - not only must there be something wrong with the question that
seems to pose the problem, but it's all just philosophizing anyway and has no
relevance to the business of psychology.
Unfortunately, psychology is, among other things, in the business of
trying to understand epistemic relationships between individuals and the world,
and of addressing other relationships that often make strong presuppositions
concerning the fact and the nature of such epistemic relationships. Even if we
accept the fact of such epistemic contact between the individual and the world,
our models and our presuppositions commit us to particular conceptions of the
nature of that epistemic contact: the simple rejection of the skeptical conclusion
that we do not have any such epistemic contact does not suffice to invalidate the
relevance of the skeptical argument to psychology.
world through the senses, and that that epistemic connection with the world
occurs via the transmission of information from the world through those senses
into a mind. The converse perspective on this same assumption is that the
environment influences individuals, both microgenetically and developmentally,
via the information that is generated in that environment and transmitted into the
minds of those individuals. I wish to contest this standard view of the nature of
epistemic contact with the world, and, therefore, also contest the corresponding
standard view of how the environment influences behavior and development.
A quick sense that there might be something wrong with both sides of the
standard view can be derived from consideration of what is usually taken to be
a purely philosophical problem with purely philosophical consequences: the
problem of skepticism (Annas & Barnes, 1985; Burnyeat, 1983; Popkin, 1979;
Rescher, 1980; Stroud, 1984; Wittgenstein, 1969). Briefly stated, the problem of
skepticism arises from the question: How can we possibly know that our
representations of the world are correct? The only answer seems to involve
checking those representations against the world to see if they in fact match,
but, by assumption, the only epistemic contact we have with the world is via
those representations themselves - any such check, therefore, is circular and
provides no epistemic ground.
Skepticism is generally relegated to philosophy, and, although
philosophers periodically attempt to discredit the skeptical question, no one has
in fact succeeded in solving it. The consensus, however, is that there has to be
something wrong with the skeptic's position, since it is clear that we do in fact
have epistemic knowledge of the world. This presumed invalidation of the
question, and, therefore, of the problem, is presupposed with even greater force
in psychology - not only must there be something wrong with the question that
seems to pose the problem, but it's all just philosophizing anyway and has no
relevance to the business of psychology.
Unfortunately, psychology is, among other things, in the business of
trying to understand epistemic relationships between individuals and the world,
and of addressing other relationships that often make strong presuppositions
concerning the fact and the nature of such epistemic relationships. Even if we
accept the fact of such epistemic contact between the individual and the world,
our models and our presuppositions commit us to particular conceptions of the
nature of that epistemic contact: the simple rejection of the skeptical conclusion
that we do not have any such epistemic contact does not suffice to invalidate the
relevance of the skeptical argument to psychology.
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