Which distinctions and differences are acceptable and which are not?
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Narrow egalitarianism, which, for some time from the 1980s onward, almost epitomized egalitarianism, focuses not on relations between people but on the distribution of goods. Accordingly, ‘equality’ means equal distribution of goods. Given such a definition, the question arises as to which goods are to be distributed equally. And given that some differences and inequalities are unavoidable or obviously justified, we have to look for an abstract cardinal good: (access to) welfare, opportunities, (access to) advantages, capabilities, resources, or something else. Narrow egalitarians have spent many years searching for such a cardinal good and discussing various proposals (Arneson, 2011; Hausman and McPherson, 2002: 135–159). Furthermore, they maintain that the cardinal good should be distributed in a luck-neutralizing way. This line of reasoning constitutes what is now termed ‘luck egalitarianism.’ It is inspired by Rawls's suggestion “to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset” and to not let the morally arbitrary natural lottery determine the distribution of social goods (Rawls, 1971: 101). According to luck egalitarianism, “an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust, and nothing can remove that particular injustice” (Cohen, 2008: 7). In other words, the distribution should be ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive (Dworkin, 2000: chapter 1 and 2).
Whatever the cardinal good that is supposed to be distributed in such a way, it seems clear that this account of equality relies heavily on a distinction between choice and (unchosen) natural as well as social circumstances. By that, luck egalitarianism retains some connection to widespread intuitions about why, for example, racist and sexist discrimination is wrong. For, roughly speaking, being discriminated is commonly conceived of as being disadvantaged (by authorities, norms, and institutions) just because of an unchosen property one cannot (reasonably be expected to) dispose of. Luck egalitarianism also appears compatible with the belief that humans are responsible agents, and that individual choices and efforts should make a difference in the distribution of goods, especially of material wealth. At least in theoretical discourse, egalitarianism thus takes a powerful idea away from its opponents and incorporates it into a critique of precisely those inequalities that used to be defended through reference to individual responsibility. It seems to take responsibility and individual desert more seriously than most self-declared proponents of meritocracy on the antiegalitarian side.
However, according to other egalitarians (and, needless to say, of non- and antiegalitarians), the fact that luck egalitarians lay so much stress on the distinction between choice and circumstance amounts to a serious shortcoming of their conception of social justice. For this distinction not only opens up the field for empirical research, it may also lead us deeper into metaphysical terrain than social analysts as well as political thinkers and actors are willing to go. Furthermore, by itself luck egalitarianism looks sociologically sterile. It seems to be mainly concerned with the question of desirability (less with feasibility, and still less so with achievability) and tends to separate distributive equality all too neatly from other politically relevant values. For luck egalitarians, says G.A. Cohen, “are interested in the very nature of distributive justice, not in the different question as to what principles, to be influenced by distributive justice but also by other things, a society should adopt as its basic ones” (Cohen, 2008: 301).