why armed revolution failed
Answers
Answer:
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Explanation:
Since the latter years of the Cold War, strong democratic revolutionary
movements seeking the overthrow of authoritarian regimes have arisen in many
countries. Such movements have succeeded in some countries, including the Philippines
(1986), South Korea (1988), the countries of Eastern Europe (1989), Russia (1991), and
Serbia (2000). On the other hand, strong democratic movements which rose up in some
other countries were crushed before they could take power in China (1989),
Burma/Mayanmar (1990), and Algeria (1992).
Strong movements seeking the ouster of incumbent authoritarian regimes and
their replacement by democratic government rose up in each of these cases. What, then,
accounts for the success of democratic revolution in some of these cases and its failure in
others? This paper will examine this question first through an examination of some of
the theoretical literature on revolution, and then through a comparison of three cases of
successful democratic revolution (the Philippines, Russia, and Serbia) with three cases of
failed democratic revolution (China, Burma/Myanmar, and Algeria).
Certain theorists, including Crane Brinton and Timothy Wickham-Crowley, have
argued that the key factor in deciding whether or not non-democratic revolution succeeds
or fails is the role of the armed forces. If the armed forces protect the ancien regime, then
the revolutionary opposition is unable to seize power. If, however, the armed forces do
not protect the ancien regime, then the revolutionaries usually do come to power. It will
be argued here that just as in attempts at non-democratic revolution, the role played by
the military is also the key factor in determining the outcome of democratic revolution.
When the military is willing to use force to protect the ancien regime, democratic
revolutionaries cannot prevail. It is only the refusal of the armed forces to do this that
allows democratic revolutionaries to succeed.
What, though, determines whether the armed forces of an authoritarian regime
will use force to suppress a democratic revolutionary movement or not? Through a
comparison of the cases mentioned above, I will argue here that the decision by the
armed forces not to protect an authoritarian regime is not the result of a democratic
conversion on the part of the military as a whole, but instead results from an
overwhelming desire to prevent conflict within the military. Thus, if even a small
number of key commanders defect to the democratic opposition, this can neutralize the
armed forces as a whole even though most military leaders may be wary of, or even
hostile to, democratization. But if these key defections to the democratic opposition do
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not occur and the military remains unified, it is able to crush the democratic
revolutionaries easily.
Revolution: The Role of the Military
The literature on why revolution occurs is both vast and deep. No attempt to
summarize this literature will be made here. For purposes of this study, it suffices to
observe that many attempts at revolution have been made, and that some of these have
succeeded while most have failed. Differing theories have also been advanced about why
this is the case (Kowalewski 1991; Foran 1997). Several scholars, though, have noted the
key role played by the military forces charged with defending the existing regime in
determining the outcome of attempts at revolution. In his classic study, The Anatomy of
Revolution, Crane Brinton stated that “no government has ever fallen before attackers
until it has lost control over its armed forces or lost the ability to use them effectively”
(Brinton 1965, 89). Brinton also pointed out how this state of affairs could come into
being when he noted that “the nowadays common view that modern weapons have for the
future made street-risings impossible is probably wrong. Modern weapons have to be
used by police or soldiers, who may still be subverted, even in the atomic age” (Brinton
1965, 88).
Other scholars have made similar findings. In her quantitative analysis of
attempts at revolution, Diana Russell concluded that a high degree of disloyalty within
the armed forces toward the regime it was supposed to protect was strongly correlated