why is it wrong to kill animals ? Write one page about i
Answers
Answer:
The duty to eat our friends
In his essay, “Eating our Friends,” Roger Scruton argues that we may agree that the current system of
industrial animal agriculture is morally problematic because of the pain and suffering it causes to non-
human animals. However, suggests that we are not only allowed to eat meat, raised humanely, but may
even have a duty to do so.
In support of his claim that we are morally permitted to eat animals that are raised and killed humanely,
he claims that for cattle:
To be killed at 30 months is not intrinsically more tragic than to be killed at 40, or 50, or 60. And
if the meat is at its best after 30 months, and if every month thereafter represents an economic
loss, who will blame the farmer for choosing so early a death? In doing so he merely reflects the
choice of the consumer, upon whose desires the whole trade in meat, and therefore the very
existence of his animals, depends.
But he goes beyond this to argue that humane animal husbandry is “a complex moral good.”
Animal farming is “one of the kindest uses of land yet devised,” and “
…the result of raising animals [traditionally, humanely] will change the character of meat-eating,
which will become not only more expensive, but more ceremonial…The animal brought to the
table will have enjoyed the friendship and protection of the one who nurtured him, and his death
will be like the ritual sacrifices described in the Bible and Homeric literature – a singling out of a
victim for an important office to which a kind of honor is attached. Such it seems to me would be
the life of the virtuous carnivore, the one who is prepared to eat only his friends.
He goes on to suggest that virtuous carnivorism will be more effective in changing farming practices than
vegetarianism. “…I would suggest not only that it is permissible for those who care about animals to eat
meat; they have a duty to do so.” Why? Conscientious carnivores can exert more pressure on those
engaged in meat production to do so only through humane practices.
II. The Surprising Claim:
Elizabeth Harman argues against “The Surprising Claim”:
(a) We have strong reasons not to cause intense pain to animals: the fact that an action would cause
intense pain to an animal makes the action wrong unless it is justified by other considerations; and
(b) We do not have strong reasons not to kill animals: it is not the case that killing an animal is wrong
unless it is justified by other considerations.
[Note that in Harman, ‘animals’ sometimes seems to mean non-human animals, and sometimes animals
generally.]
A. Argument against the Surprising Claim:
1. If it is true that we have strong moral reasons against causing intense pain to animals, such that doing
so is impermissible unless justified by other considerations, then part of the explanation of this truth is that
animals have moral status.
2. If it is true that we have strong moral reasons against causing intense pain to animals, such that doing
so is impermissible unless justified by other considerations, then part of the explanation of this truth is that
significantly harming something with moral status is impermissible unless justified by other considerations.
3. If an action painlessly kills a healthy animal in the prime of life, then that action significantly harms the
animal.
4. If it is true that we have strong moral reasons against causing pain to animals, such that doing so is
impermissible unless justified other considerations then painlessly killing a healthy animal in the prime of
life is impermissible unless justified by other considerations.
5. Therefore, the Surprising Claim is false.