Why should we accomplish our duties with dignity
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Michael Rosen's Dignity is an interesting, insightful, and stimulating study of the history and uses of the concept of dignity in moral, political, and legal contexts. Its aims are not just descriptive, but also interpretive and philosophical, or at any rate, "theoretical." Rosen writes engagingly for a general audience beyond disciplinary boundaries and without the "impersonality" and "closed-borders policy" that can make professional philosophy "inaccessible" to the wider public (xiii, xvi). His method is that of "political theory," which is "prepared to allow facts into our normative reflection and use history as part of our conceptual analysis." Political theory is, he says, "the oasis where the caravans meet" (xvi).
At the same time, Rosen enters self-consciously into two areas "that are as densely populated as any region of philosophy": the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy and "the character of moral duty" (xiv-xv). His reading of Kant on dignity, duty, and the connections between them is nuanced and suggestive, and it places Kant helpfully against the background of earlier dignity traditions in Cicero, Aquinas, Pico, Bossuet, and Roman Catholicism. Rosen's own "Kantian" ideas about moral duty, dignity, and respect are also extremely interesting, if not perhaps so original as he sometimes portrays them.
In this review, I will concentrate mainly on Dignity's more philosophical aspects. One of the nicest things about the book, however, is a lengthy chapter (Chapter 2, "The Legislation of Dignity") that includes perceptive and fascinating discussion of the ways the concept of dignity has entered into the law and judicial decisions of contemporary Europe, most notably in Germany, whose Grundgesetz begins as follows:
(1) Human dignity is inviolable [unantastbar]. To respect it and protect it is the duty of all state power.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable [unverletzlichen] and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. (78)
Kant's claim that human beings have an inviolable dignity is clearly an inspiration for these clauses, but Rosen shows how the Roman Catholic dignity tradition is also, and how contingencies of German political history following World War II made this especially salient. This makes for intriguing issues of constitutional interpretation, as he deftly illustrates.