a short note on dictatorship in Pakistan
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Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan
by Hassan N. Gardezi
[22 December 1999]
The wheel of military coups turned once again in Pakistan on
October 12, 1999 and brought the entire country under direct military rule
for the fourth time. I was reminded of a retired colonel who had once
confided that a manual on how to stage bloodless coups has been in
circulation among the officer corps of the Pakistan army for a long while.
So it was small wonder that when time came Gen. Parvez Musharraf's men
seized power with textbook precision. The only thing new about this coup
was the theatrics staged by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his attempt to
remove the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), appointed by himself a few months
earlier, which backfired.
In contrast to the banality of the event the media commentary and
international reaction that followed attached great significance to the
military takeover, but on the basis of two opposite perceptions both of
which missed the central point of the reality of Pakistani state. The
first perception originating mainly with the media commentators and
political analysts within Pakistan blamed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's
increasingly corrupt, manipulative and oppressive government for the
latest military intervention, while at the same time raising hopes that
the coup makers will return the country to democracy "after cleaning up
the mess." This view was reinforced by the calmness, even a sense of
relief, that characterised the response of a cynical public to the
dismissal of Nawaz Sharif's elected but much discredited government.
The second perception was revealed in the form of a strong and
swift international reaction to the military coup in Pakistan. The United
States, having backed every ruthless dictatorship in the past was quick to
disapprove the removal of Nawaz Sharif's civilian government as a serious
deviation from democratic norms and threatened the continuation of
sanctions imposed earlier at the time of Pakistan's nuclear tests. The IMF
hinted at suspension of its loan installments to the military regime. The
British Commonwealth and the European Union decided to dispatch
high-profile delegations to investigate the situation and to urge prompt
restoration of civilian rule within a fixed time frame or face
ostracisation.
But it so happens that none of these perceptions of the October
12 coup are correct and as a consequence any course of action based on
these perceptions for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is a mere
illusion. In order to understand the reasons for the failure of
parliamentary democracy to take root in Pakistan one has to understand the
central reality of the Pakistani state. To put it in a few words, the
state in Pakistan has evolved into a highly centralized, unitary and
oligarchic instrument which continues to operate in a neo-colonial
framework.
by Hassan N. Gardezi
[22 December 1999]
The wheel of military coups turned once again in Pakistan on
October 12, 1999 and brought the entire country under direct military rule
for the fourth time. I was reminded of a retired colonel who had once
confided that a manual on how to stage bloodless coups has been in
circulation among the officer corps of the Pakistan army for a long while.
So it was small wonder that when time came Gen. Parvez Musharraf's men
seized power with textbook precision. The only thing new about this coup
was the theatrics staged by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his attempt to
remove the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), appointed by himself a few months
earlier, which backfired.
In contrast to the banality of the event the media commentary and
international reaction that followed attached great significance to the
military takeover, but on the basis of two opposite perceptions both of
which missed the central point of the reality of Pakistani state. The
first perception originating mainly with the media commentators and
political analysts within Pakistan blamed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's
increasingly corrupt, manipulative and oppressive government for the
latest military intervention, while at the same time raising hopes that
the coup makers will return the country to democracy "after cleaning up
the mess." This view was reinforced by the calmness, even a sense of
relief, that characterised the response of a cynical public to the
dismissal of Nawaz Sharif's elected but much discredited government.
The second perception was revealed in the form of a strong and
swift international reaction to the military coup in Pakistan. The United
States, having backed every ruthless dictatorship in the past was quick to
disapprove the removal of Nawaz Sharif's civilian government as a serious
deviation from democratic norms and threatened the continuation of
sanctions imposed earlier at the time of Pakistan's nuclear tests. The IMF
hinted at suspension of its loan installments to the military regime. The
British Commonwealth and the European Union decided to dispatch
high-profile delegations to investigate the situation and to urge prompt
restoration of civilian rule within a fixed time frame or face
ostracisation.
But it so happens that none of these perceptions of the October
12 coup are correct and as a consequence any course of action based on
these perceptions for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is a mere
illusion. In order to understand the reasons for the failure of
parliamentary democracy to take root in Pakistan one has to understand the
central reality of the Pakistani state. To put it in a few words, the
state in Pakistan has evolved into a highly centralized, unitary and
oligarchic instrument which continues to operate in a neo-colonial
framework.
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