How does our conscience influence us in hamlets dilemma?
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problems result from such dilemmas, most have addressed themselves to the
question of ho to get people to cooperate. Answers have ranged from
imposition of a dictatorship (Leviathan) to "mutual coercion mutually
agreed upon," to appeals to conscience.
This paper reviews the structure and ubiquity of social dilemma problems, outlines proposed "solutions," and then surveys the contributions of
psychologists who have studied dilemma behavior in the context of
N-person games (N > 2). The hypothesis that follows from this survey and
review is that there are two crucial factors that lead people to cooperate in
a social dilemma situation. First, people must "think about" and come to
understand the nature of the dilemma, so that moral, normative, and altruistic concerns as well as external payoffs can influence behavior. Second,
people must have some reason for believing that others will not defect, for
while the difference in payoffs may always favor defection no matter what
others do, the absolute payoff is higher if others cooperate than if they don't.
The efficacy of both factors-and indeed the possibility of cooperative
behavior at all in a dilemma situation-is based upon rejecting the principle
of "nonsatiety of economic greed" as an axiom of actual human behavior.
And it is rejected.
INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL
DILEMMAS
Social dilemmas are characterized by two properties: (a) the social payoff
to each individual for defecting behavior is higher than the payoff for
cooperative behavior, regardless of what the other society members do, yet
(b) all individuals in the society receive a lower payoff if all defect than if
all cooperate.
Examples abound. People asked to keep their thermostats low to conserve energy are being asked to suffer from the cold without appreciably
conserving the fuel supply by their individual sacrifices; yet if all keep their
thermostats high, all may run out of fuel and freeze. During pollution alerts
in Eugene, Oregon, residents are asked to ride bicycles or walk rather than
to drive their cars. But each person is better off driving, because his or her
car's contribution to the pollution problem is negligible, while a choice to
bicycle or walk yields the payoff of the drivers' exhausts. Yet all the residents are worse off driving their cars and maintaining the pollution than
they would be if all bicycled or walked. Soldiers who fight in a large battle
can reasonably conclude that no matter what their comrades do they personally are better off taking no chances; yet if no one takes chances, the
result will be a rout and slaughter worse for all the soldiers than is taking
question of ho to get people to cooperate. Answers have ranged from
imposition of a dictatorship (Leviathan) to "mutual coercion mutually
agreed upon," to appeals to conscience.
This paper reviews the structure and ubiquity of social dilemma problems, outlines proposed "solutions," and then surveys the contributions of
psychologists who have studied dilemma behavior in the context of
N-person games (N > 2). The hypothesis that follows from this survey and
review is that there are two crucial factors that lead people to cooperate in
a social dilemma situation. First, people must "think about" and come to
understand the nature of the dilemma, so that moral, normative, and altruistic concerns as well as external payoffs can influence behavior. Second,
people must have some reason for believing that others will not defect, for
while the difference in payoffs may always favor defection no matter what
others do, the absolute payoff is higher if others cooperate than if they don't.
The efficacy of both factors-and indeed the possibility of cooperative
behavior at all in a dilemma situation-is based upon rejecting the principle
of "nonsatiety of economic greed" as an axiom of actual human behavior.
And it is rejected.
INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL
DILEMMAS
Social dilemmas are characterized by two properties: (a) the social payoff
to each individual for defecting behavior is higher than the payoff for
cooperative behavior, regardless of what the other society members do, yet
(b) all individuals in the society receive a lower payoff if all defect than if
all cooperate.
Examples abound. People asked to keep their thermostats low to conserve energy are being asked to suffer from the cold without appreciably
conserving the fuel supply by their individual sacrifices; yet if all keep their
thermostats high, all may run out of fuel and freeze. During pollution alerts
in Eugene, Oregon, residents are asked to ride bicycles or walk rather than
to drive their cars. But each person is better off driving, because his or her
car's contribution to the pollution problem is negligible, while a choice to
bicycle or walk yields the payoff of the drivers' exhausts. Yet all the residents are worse off driving their cars and maintaining the pollution than
they would be if all bicycled or walked. Soldiers who fight in a large battle
can reasonably conclude that no matter what their comrades do they personally are better off taking no chances; yet if no one takes chances, the
result will be a rout and slaughter worse for all the soldiers than is taking
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