How the policies failed in vietnam?
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Principally to deny China an excuse to replicate its Korean War actions and intervene militarily in the Vietnam War, U.S. ground forces’ operations were restricted to the territory of South Vietnam. North Vietnam would remain “off limits” to U.S. and South Vietnamese ground combat forces throughout the war. This was also extended for most of American involvement in the Vietnam War to respecting the “neutrality” of the bordering countries, Laos and Cambodia, large portions of which as early as 1960 had, in effect, been invaded and occupied by North Vietnam to establish the Ho Chi Minh Trail – the main route of communist troops, weapons and supplies flowing into South Vietnam. (The limited 1970-71 U.S. and South Vietnamese ground operations in portions of Cambodia and Laos proved too little, too late.)
The restriction confining the ground war to South Vietnam did not apply to American aerial bombing. Indeed, North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail were bombed extensively. Yet the bombing campaign, whose targets were tightly controlled by Washington, was not decisive in determining the war’s outcome.
Despite what seemed the most effective policy for keeping China out of the war, the long-term effect of confining ground operations within South Vietnam’s borders proved irretrievably fatal to any hope America had of winning the war outright. It meant that U.S. military commanders were never given a mission to win the Vietnam War, but only to prevent South Vietnam from losing it. The distinction is no mere exercise in semantics – it was the key element in the U.S. defeat. This reactive strategy placed American forces permanently on the strategic defensive. Although U.S. ground forces did conduct offensives within South Vietnam at the operational and tactical levels, America had surrendered the strategic initiative to North Vietnam, which was then free to set the tempo of the war by feeding troops and materiel into South Vietnam as it wished.
By choosing the strategic defensive, U.S. leaders created a “localized” war of attrition that would drag on as long as both sides possessed the will to continue. North Vietnam simply had to prolong its war within South Vietnam until the United States inevitably abandoned the conflict. In this clash of national wills, North Vietnam proved to be better armed. The communist dictatorship possessed the “weapons” it needed to persevere as long as it took to win: a ruthless disregard of casualties and total control of its captive population.
America lost the Vietnam War the moment its leaders chose to “refight the last war” by surrendering the initiative in the conflict to the North Vietnamese.
The restriction confining the ground war to South Vietnam did not apply to American aerial bombing. Indeed, North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail were bombed extensively. Yet the bombing campaign, whose targets were tightly controlled by Washington, was not decisive in determining the war’s outcome.
Despite what seemed the most effective policy for keeping China out of the war, the long-term effect of confining ground operations within South Vietnam’s borders proved irretrievably fatal to any hope America had of winning the war outright. It meant that U.S. military commanders were never given a mission to win the Vietnam War, but only to prevent South Vietnam from losing it. The distinction is no mere exercise in semantics – it was the key element in the U.S. defeat. This reactive strategy placed American forces permanently on the strategic defensive. Although U.S. ground forces did conduct offensives within South Vietnam at the operational and tactical levels, America had surrendered the strategic initiative to North Vietnam, which was then free to set the tempo of the war by feeding troops and materiel into South Vietnam as it wished.
By choosing the strategic defensive, U.S. leaders created a “localized” war of attrition that would drag on as long as both sides possessed the will to continue. North Vietnam simply had to prolong its war within South Vietnam until the United States inevitably abandoned the conflict. In this clash of national wills, North Vietnam proved to be better armed. The communist dictatorship possessed the “weapons” it needed to persevere as long as it took to win: a ruthless disregard of casualties and total control of its captive population.
America lost the Vietnam War the moment its leaders chose to “refight the last war” by surrendering the initiative in the conflict to the North Vietnamese.
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operations throughout the conflict.
STRATEGY FOR FAILURE
Principally to deny China an excuse to replicate its Korean War actions and intervene militarily in the Vietnam War, U.S. ground forces’ operations were restricted to the territory of South Vietnam. North Vietnam would remain “off limits” to U.S. and South Vietnamese ground combat forces throughout the war. This was also extended for most of American involvement in the Vietnam War to respecting the “neutrality” of the bordering countries, Laos and Cambodia, large portions of which as early as 1960 had, in effect, been invaded and occupied by North Vietnam to establish the Ho Chi Minh Trail – the main route of communist troops, weapons and supplies flowing into South Vietnam. (The limited 1970-71 U.S. and South Vietnamese ground operations in portions of Cambodia and Laos proved too little, too late.)
The restriction confining the ground war to South Vietnam did not apply to American aerial bombing. Indeed, North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail were bombed extensively. Yet the bombing campaign, whose targets were tightly controlled by Washington, was not decisive in determining the war’s outcome.
Despite what seemed the most effective policy for keeping China out of the war, the long-term effect of confining ground operations within South Vietnam’s borders proved irretrievably fatal to any hope America had of winning the war outright. It meant that U.S. military commanders were never given a mission to win the Vietnam War, but only to prevent South Vietnam from losing it. The distinction is no mere exercise in semantics – it was the key element in the U.S. defeat. This reactive strategy placed American forces permanently on the strategic defensive. Although U.S. ground forces did conduct offensives within South Vietnam at the operational and tactical levels, America had surrendered the strategic initiative to North Vietnam, which was then free to set the tempo of the war by feeding troops and materiel into South Vietnam as it wished.
By choosing the strategic defensive, U.S. leaders created a “localized” war of attrition that would drag on as long as both sides possessed the will to continue. North Vietnam simply had to prolong its war within South Vietnam until the United States inevitably abandoned the conflict. In this clash of national wills, North Vietnam proved to be better armed. The communist dictatorship possessed the “weapons” it needed to persevere as long as it took to win: a ruthless disregard of casualties and total control of its captive population.
America lost the Vietnam War the moment its leaders chose to “refight the last war” by surrendering the initiative in the conflict to the North Vietnamese.
STRATEGY FOR FAILURE
Principally to deny China an excuse to replicate its Korean War actions and intervene militarily in the Vietnam War, U.S. ground forces’ operations were restricted to the territory of South Vietnam. North Vietnam would remain “off limits” to U.S. and South Vietnamese ground combat forces throughout the war. This was also extended for most of American involvement in the Vietnam War to respecting the “neutrality” of the bordering countries, Laos and Cambodia, large portions of which as early as 1960 had, in effect, been invaded and occupied by North Vietnam to establish the Ho Chi Minh Trail – the main route of communist troops, weapons and supplies flowing into South Vietnam. (The limited 1970-71 U.S. and South Vietnamese ground operations in portions of Cambodia and Laos proved too little, too late.)
The restriction confining the ground war to South Vietnam did not apply to American aerial bombing. Indeed, North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail were bombed extensively. Yet the bombing campaign, whose targets were tightly controlled by Washington, was not decisive in determining the war’s outcome.
Despite what seemed the most effective policy for keeping China out of the war, the long-term effect of confining ground operations within South Vietnam’s borders proved irretrievably fatal to any hope America had of winning the war outright. It meant that U.S. military commanders were never given a mission to win the Vietnam War, but only to prevent South Vietnam from losing it. The distinction is no mere exercise in semantics – it was the key element in the U.S. defeat. This reactive strategy placed American forces permanently on the strategic defensive. Although U.S. ground forces did conduct offensives within South Vietnam at the operational and tactical levels, America had surrendered the strategic initiative to North Vietnam, which was then free to set the tempo of the war by feeding troops and materiel into South Vietnam as it wished.
By choosing the strategic defensive, U.S. leaders created a “localized” war of attrition that would drag on as long as both sides possessed the will to continue. North Vietnam simply had to prolong its war within South Vietnam until the United States inevitably abandoned the conflict. In this clash of national wills, North Vietnam proved to be better armed. The communist dictatorship possessed the “weapons” it needed to persevere as long as it took to win: a ruthless disregard of casualties and total control of its captive population.
America lost the Vietnam War the moment its leaders chose to “refight the last war” by surrendering the initiative in the conflict to the North Vietnamese.
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