Is india becoming a threat in the development of indian subcontinent through its war strategies speech?
Answers
Answer:
here is your speech and All the best.
Explanation:
On 14 February, a convoy carrying Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel was attacked by a suicide bomber in Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 soldiers. The attack was claimed by the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a United Nations-designated terrorist outfit whose founder, Masood Azhar, currently resides in Pakistan.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised revenge for the attack, saying a “befitting reply” to Pakistan would be given to assuage the Indian populace, whose “blood is boiling” after the death of the soldiers. Modi also stated that the army had a free hand to retaliate in a manner it deemed fit, with Lieutenant General Kanwal Jeet Singh Dhillon issuing a warning that all Kashmiri militants would be “eliminated”. News commentators too have called the attack an “act of war.”
Besides the operation four days after the Pulwama attack which killed three JeM operatives, India recently launched a “non-military pre-emptive strike” targeting a JeM training camp in Balakot. In response, the Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi termed the strike an “act of aggression” that violated the Line of Control, and that Pakistan had every right to respond.
In light of the escalating rhetoric within India and also between the two nations, this reading list explores articles in EPW's Strategic Affairs column by Ali Ahmed, a former UN official, which look at the realities of declaring war in the subcontinent.
1) What Is India’s Strategy?
The present government has refrained from publishing a national defence white paper. Ali Ahmed writes that operations such as the “surgical strike” across the LoC suggest that India’s disposition towards the use of force has changed from traditional “strategic restraint” to “strategic proactivism”. He argues that this shift will not bring about greater security, and that such proactivism is the influence of cultural nationalism in strategic thinking.
It is questionable as to whether India has the strategic wherewithal to think through such a strategy. Its national security instruments are far too disjointed to put together such a complex strategy… Doctrine-making is never left to professional strategists, but is an intensely political exercise. Paying attention to the defence minister’s remarks on the cultural nationalist inspiration of proactivism provides a hint (Times of India 2016). By this yardstick, strategic proactivism is only chimerically about external security in relation to Pakistan and its internal security blowback in Kashmir. Instead, structural proactivism is the cultural nationalist imprint on national security.
2) What Happens if India Goes to War?
According to Ahmed, the 2017 Indian armed forces joint doctrine is conceptually flawed. Definitions of terms in the doctrine are suspect. For one, it defines peace as the absence of threat and conflict as a threat that necessitates military measures. It neglects that threats could exist during peacetime, and that military measures could be used in these instances to prevent a transition into conflict.
Some problematic phrases also give one pause for thought. One such phrase is “decisive victory,” occurring thrice in the document. When obtaining politically desirable outcomes is sufficient as a military aim, going for decisive victory can be overkill and is unnecessarily escalatory. The armed forces intend to “shock, dislocate and overwhelm” the enemy. After mobilising “swiftly” and with an “early launch” of operations, they are to “rapidly achieve tangible gains” (p 19). This appears to be a hangover of the Cold Start doctrine, as the 2004 army doctrine was colloquially referred to.
The Indian Army also recently published the “Land Warfare Doctrine” which Ahmed contends displays the army’s inability to move beyond its fixation of Pakistan as the primary threat to national security. In the event of a “two–front war”, the Chinese front is expected to be of secondary concern. More importantly, however, Ahmed asserts that the fundamental gap in this doctrine is that it does not address the nuclear factor. The doctrine details how to get into a war, but not how to de-escalate and exit one, in case it goes nuclear.
In so far as the “collusive” threat—described as the “greatest danger”—figuring in the LWD, the government can afford to overlook it as a small price to pay since the threat is unlikely to materialise… A holistic nuclear doctrine would require expansion from its current-day focus on deterrence and employment of nuclear weapons in conflict, to include conflict containment, de-escalation, and termination. Any conventional-level implications need inclusion in a comprehensive LWD. Else, what is there to distinguish an LWD written in the nuclear age?