what are Indian frogien policy
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•Foreign policy of the Narendra Modi government.
• The foreign policy of the Modi government (also referred to as the Modi Doctrine) concerns the policy initiatives made towards other states by the current Modi government after he assumed office as Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014.
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•Foreign policy of the Narendra Modi government.
• The foreign policy of the Modi government (also referred to as the Modi Doctrine) concerns the policy initiatives made towards other states by the current Modi government after he assumed office as Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014.
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Nonetheless, India remains a great, nuclear power with important geopolitical interests—it is the world’s largest importer of arms, according to Dhruva Jaishankar, a fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India and the moderator of the panel. This dichotomy, or paradox, is woven into India’s experience with the contemporary world: it has enormous wealth, power, and potential, and yet, it must still overcome many challenges to be a increasingly consequential world player: it faces “tough administrative and military reforms as it transitions from historically what has been a much more inward looking country to a much more outward looking country,” according to Jaishankar. Yet, most of India’s security challenges are in its immediate neighborhood, and involve China and Pakistan.
These factors all condition India’s foreign policy and domestic priorities, which is why India is, for the United States, “important but never urgent,” despite the current administration’s rebranding of the Pacific region to the Indo-Pacific region. While this is reflective of the fact that India is growing in importance, India is still not a primary player in most of the major issues concerning U.S. policy in Asia. Despite its participation in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia, India is not going to join any sort of formal alliance designed to contain China in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Even closer to its own neighborhood, India is not really “a consequential player” in Afghanistan’s security environment despite its legitimate interests there, according to Joshua T. White, a nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and associate professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
The most important factor in India’s rise, its relations with its neighbors, with China, and with the United States is its economic growth, and its ability to translate this growth into power and influence. This is where India has the most work to do. As Constantino Xavier, fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India, noted, China’s rise has driven India to increase its efforts to increase interconnectivity in South Asia, one of the world’s least connected regions. Interconnectivity has been a major factor in spreading economic prosperity through trade in Eastern Asia, now it has potential to work similarly in South Asia. Connectivity is how India can remain relevant to its neighbors, now that the Cold War strategic and economic insulation of the region is over, and, as such, is a strategic imperative in addition to an economic one. Countries often have a choice between a “poisoned gift from China or no gift from India, which is very weak on delivery.” With even a moderate improvement in its ability to deliver projects on time, India can gain a leg up on China if it offers assistance without the debt and political intimidation that now comes with Chinese aid.
All this reflects both the limits of the will and capacity of the Indian state to as yet take on a greater mantle in international politics. But this may be a temporary state of affairs: the panelists all stressed that India is now taking steps toward rectifying its past mistakes, and is deploying its resources to improving its relations with its neighbors and other states in Asia. Moreover, the panelists all also stressed the need for the U.S. relationship with India to be a long-term investment. Setting back the bilateral Indo-U.S. relationship, over say, Iran’s import of oil from Iran, would be incredibly short-sighted. Additionally, the United States must still take India’s security needs into account no matter how it decides to move forward in Afghanistan, and it must acknowledge that India still has regional expertise and political contacts in that country that the United States simply does not. After all, India cultivated the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan long before 9/11.
These factors all condition India’s foreign policy and domestic priorities, which is why India is, for the United States, “important but never urgent,” despite the current administration’s rebranding of the Pacific region to the Indo-Pacific region. While this is reflective of the fact that India is growing in importance, India is still not a primary player in most of the major issues concerning U.S. policy in Asia. Despite its participation in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia, India is not going to join any sort of formal alliance designed to contain China in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Even closer to its own neighborhood, India is not really “a consequential player” in Afghanistan’s security environment despite its legitimate interests there, according to Joshua T. White, a nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and associate professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
The most important factor in India’s rise, its relations with its neighbors, with China, and with the United States is its economic growth, and its ability to translate this growth into power and influence. This is where India has the most work to do. As Constantino Xavier, fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India, noted, China’s rise has driven India to increase its efforts to increase interconnectivity in South Asia, one of the world’s least connected regions. Interconnectivity has been a major factor in spreading economic prosperity through trade in Eastern Asia, now it has potential to work similarly in South Asia. Connectivity is how India can remain relevant to its neighbors, now that the Cold War strategic and economic insulation of the region is over, and, as such, is a strategic imperative in addition to an economic one. Countries often have a choice between a “poisoned gift from China or no gift from India, which is very weak on delivery.” With even a moderate improvement in its ability to deliver projects on time, India can gain a leg up on China if it offers assistance without the debt and political intimidation that now comes with Chinese aid.
All this reflects both the limits of the will and capacity of the Indian state to as yet take on a greater mantle in international politics. But this may be a temporary state of affairs: the panelists all stressed that India is now taking steps toward rectifying its past mistakes, and is deploying its resources to improving its relations with its neighbors and other states in Asia. Moreover, the panelists all also stressed the need for the U.S. relationship with India to be a long-term investment. Setting back the bilateral Indo-U.S. relationship, over say, Iran’s import of oil from Iran, would be incredibly short-sighted. Additionally, the United States must still take India’s security needs into account no matter how it decides to move forward in Afghanistan, and it must acknowledge that India still has regional expertise and political contacts in that country that the United States simply does not. After all, India cultivated the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan long before 9/11.
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