what are the certain socio-political and economic objectives in the indian democracy
Answers
Answer:
India has been acclaimed in recent years as an information technology (IT) superpower
and perhaps even as a major new player in the world economy. The Indian economy has
been growing at around 5 or 6% per annum since 2003, adjusted for population growth,
and there are good reasons to suppose that similar rates of growth of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita might be sustainable over the next twenty years. Savings rates
are very high in India. Indeed, at just over 30% of GDP, gross domestic savings are
approaching East Asian levels. The economy sits well inside its total factor productivity
frontier, in large part because of low levels of human capital formation, and the country
now has the chance to reap a demographic dividend: the ratio of dependents to workers is
set to decline from just over 0.6 in 2000 to just under 0.5 in 2025.1 The launch in January
2008 of the Tata Nano seemed like icing on this cake of economic success. Much was
made in the West about a car selling for $2,500, but in India the marketing of a car for one
lakh (100,000) rupees spoke to the existence of a mass middle class. It also signalled the
rise of a small group of Indian capitalists and entrepreneurs who could bestride the global
stage. Four-lane highways packed with Nanos offered a vision of India far removed from
one of pot-holed roads shared by bullock carts, scooters and state-built Ambassador cars.
In the words of Gurcharan Das, India had been unbound.2 It had escaped from a
Kafkaesque world of bureaucratic red-tape to take its place in the global information age.
Now, there are clearly nuggets of truth in accounts of India’s political economy that
hinge around 1991, as Das’s book largely does. Yet the notion that all was bad or sick
before “the reforms” or that all has been good or healthy since, fails to provide a nuanced
picture of economic development in India since Independence. Recent academic work
Explanation:
India has been acclaimed in recent years as an information technology (IT) superpower
and perhaps even as a major new player in the world economy. The Indian economy has
been growing at around 5 or 6% per annum since 2003, adjusted for population growth,
and there are good reasons to suppose that similar rates of growth of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita might be sustainable over the next twenty years. Savings rates
are very high in India. Indeed, at just over 30% of GDP, gross domestic savings are
approaching East Asian levels. The economy sits well inside its total factor productivity
frontier, in large part because of low levels of human capital formation, and the country
now has the chance to reap a demographic dividend: the ratio of dependents to workers is
set to decline from just over 0.6 in 2000 to just under 0.5 in 2025.1 The launch in January
2008 of the Tata Nano seemed like icing on this cake of economic success. Much was
made in the West about a car selling for $2,500, but in India the marketing of a car for one
lakh (100,000) rupees spoke to the existence of a mass middle class. It also signalled the
rise of a small group of Indian capitalists and entrepreneurs who could bestride the global
stage. Four-lane highways packed with Nanos offered a vision of India far removed from
one of pot-holed roads shared by bullock carts, scooters and state-built Ambassador cars.
In the words of Gurcharan Das, India had been unbound.2 It had escaped from a
Kafkaesque world of bureaucratic red-tape to take its place in the global information age.
Now, there are clearly nuggets of truth in accounts of India’s political economy that
hinge around 1991, as Das’s book largely does. Yet the notion that all was bad or sick
before “the reforms” or that all has been good or healthy since, fails to provide a nuanced
picture of economic development in India since Independence. Recent academic work